Arche-Fossils and Apocalypse, Part 2

The notion of dia-chronic statements is one element of the dispute between Meillassoux and Hagglund. In order to properly frame this encounter, it is necessary to briefly discuss the nature of Radical Atheism. Hagglund portrays his book as a reading of Derrida, but it is also an original work of philosophy; Hagglund is, arguably, ventriloquizing his thoughts through Derrida's words. In light of this, it is acceptable to attribute the ideas and arguments of Radical Atheism to Hagglund himself, rather than constantly invoking the absent Derrida.

Hagglund's arguments rely heavily on his elaboration of temporal succession. The question is: how does one moment pass into the next? Each now cannot be annihilated by a future now, because the previous now would have passed into non-being; the future now cannot have a relation with the present now. Rather than claim that time is non-being in itself, Hagglund argues that each moment must be internally split from the very beginning; every moment is split between the has-been and the not-yet. Any given moment, therefore, cannot subsist as present in-itself.

It is the present's inability to be present-in-itself that forms the core of Hagglund's objection to the principle of non-contradiction, another of his disagreements with Meillassoux - but this issue currently lays outside our remit. Our line of reflection lies on a different path: the trace as synthesis, the infinitely finite time of survival, the impossibility of apocalypse, and finally, the conflict between that impossibility and the possibility of dia-chronic statements.

Given that every manifestation is internally split along temporal lines, the question of synthesis - that is, identity - must be answered anew. If being is not presence, if it does not persist in-itself from moment to moment, how is any given case of identity possible? Hagglund claims the trace is the "agent" of synthesis. In order for any moment to be, it must be inscribed materially - Hagglund calls this the becoming space of time. However, every inscription must be open to the succession of time and, therefore, potential alterations and erasures. This openness to succession is the becoming time of space. The material inscription of the temporal moment is referred to synonymously as the trace, spacing and différance.

The temporal split that necessitates the trace and the inscription's openness to alteration and erasure forms what Hagglund calls the infinitely finite. Temporal succession is always the moment (T) plus one. Time is T + 1, into infinity. Each future negates the past, forming a negative infinity. Hagglund accepts that only a positive infinity is a true infinity, therefore succession is finite - but an infinite finitude, without possible end. (Actually, I'm not sure if that is exactly correct)

Finitude is another mark of that which is not present in itself. All things are finite, all things are open to erasure and or alteration. This is the core of his polemic against the religious, which, in his terms, always holds one term to be above this openness. For religion, there is always one infinite, present in itself being. To be above openness, however, is to be above the very possibility of change. In other words, it be pure presence is to be changeless, motionless, lifeless.

For Kant, immorality was one of his regulative ideas. He considered it to be uncognizable because it necessarily implied atemporality, but it was thinkable as an idea. More than thinkable, it was desirable on an ethical basis. Hagglund argues that immorality is neither thinkable nor desirable, on the basis of the above; to be atemporal, to be outside succession, is to be fully present and therefore outside life. The absolute good of immortality is indistinguishable from the absolute evil of death.

Because of immortality's identity with death - its basic undesirability and subsequent self-refutation - we inevitably must affirm the mortal time of survival. Everything we do presupposes the infinitely finite time of survival, even suicide. The affirmation of mortality is utterly inescapable, and this is not a negative predicament to be mourned. Mortality is the condition of life itself, which is to say, life and death are co-implicated from the very beginnings.

The key issue in relation to Meillassoux is this insistence that the trace is the condition of life, rather than the condition of any existence whatsoever. The inscription that is the becoming space of time is always the inscription of a life. On page 19, Hagglund says the openness applies all the way up and down, "all the way down to the minimal forms of life." It "applies to all the fields of the living." Now, Hagglund does not make any explicit distinction between inanimate matter and biological life. He appears to be describing the trace as the condition of any change whatsoever, but always explicitly indexes the trace to life as such.

Leaving aside the question of Hagglund's relationship to correlationism aside for the moment, it is worth analyzing Hagglund's discussion of apocalypse in light of dia-chronicity. Kant knows that atemporal immorality - as the end of time and succession - is uncognizable, so his solution is to posit the end as an Idea, "which only appears to be the same as annihilation for us as time-bound creatures." (RA, 45 K843) Kant defends this through a reading of apocalyptic writings, noting that the word apocalypse derives from the Greek word for "revelation." It is the end of a world where the timeless truth is revealed and everything temporal is destroyed. This consummation can only be an Idea; if we try to cognize it, we end in contradiction.

Hagglund reads two of Derrida's texts on apocalypse. The first is "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy." Derrida uses the word Come (Viens) against the idea of the apocalypse. It is the coming of time as the ultra transcendental condition for all events. The second text is "No Apocalypse, Not Now." Written for a conference on nuclear war, it claimed that nuclear war would destroy everything. This is the only way for time to end. Nuclear war would destroy all symbolic capacity, and the movement of survival.

Hagglund argues that the trace undermines the very idea of apocalypse, because apocalypse hinges on the distinction between temporal appearance and the thing in itself. For an apocalypse to be an apocalypse, it would have to destroy everything and reveal an indestructible thing in itself. Given that the trace is the necessary condition of being, the elimination of the trace via the elimination of the archive would be an "absolute destructibility that does not exempt anything." (RA, 46)

Significantly, Hagglund says that absolute destructibility "reinforces the radical finitude that deconstruction articulates as the condition for life in general. As a finite being I am always living in relation to the threat of absolute destruction, since with my death the entire world that opens through me and that lives in me will be extinguished." (RA, 47)

The conflict between absolute destructibility and dia-chronicity should be clear. The trace, as the condition for being in general, is indexed to the existence of the archive's inscriptions. An apocalyptic revelation is therefore impossible; with the absolute destruction of the trace/archive, no thing in itself would stand revealed. After the absolute destruction of the trace and manifestation, only nothingness would remain. In Meillassoux's terms, the nuclear annihilation of one of the terms of the correlation would also result in the annihilation of the relation itself, and therefore being itself would cease (to be is to be a correlate).

However, as we have seen, science is perfectly capable of making statements that subtract one term of the relation in order to exam the other term as it is in itself, that is, mathematically. Science is capable of formulating mathematical statements about the universe as it will be after the annihilation of humans, or even after the universe reaches a state of absolute entropy. In other words, apocalypse - the elimination of the manifestation and revelation of the pure in-itself - is entirely possible, and perhaps inevitable.

What we have here is, in fact, the beginnings of a refutation not only of infinite finitude, but also of Hagglund's conception of change (i.e., potentiality, virtuality and actuality) and even a neutering of Hagglund's critique of non-contradiction.